Retention and Meaning
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Abstract
Some philosophers have tried to account for belief retention and our belief states concerning days that we track and think of in terms of the linguistic meaning of the indexicals we use to refer to them such as ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’. In this paper I discuss a couple of representative attempts to show that this is the case and argue that they are implausible. I end up proposing an alternative view that explains the relevant data better. In so doing, both for illustrative and argumentative purposes, I show that in this respect the case concerning days is not different from the case featuring spatio-temporal objects.
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Božičković, V. Retention and Meaning. ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, 43(1), 41–51. https://doi.org/10.19090/gff.2018.1.41-51
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References
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Bozickovic, V. (2008). Cognitive Significance and Reflexive Content. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31(5), 545-554.
Bozickovic, V. (2015). Belief Retention: A Fregean Account, Erkenntnis, 80(3), 477-486
Bozickovic, V. (2017). Slicing Thoughts, American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(1), 3-13.
Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Frege, G. (1918). Thoughts, in his Logical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, 1-30.
Kaplan, David (1989). Demonstratives, Almog, J., Perry, J., Wettstein, H., (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 481-563.
Luntley, M. (1997). Dynamic Thoughts and Empty Minds, Dokic, Jerome (ed). Cognitive Dynamics, European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2, CSLI Publications, Stanford.
McDowell, J. (1984). De Re Senses. The Philosophical Quarterly, 34(136), pp. 283-94.
Perry, J. (1977). Frege on Demonstratives, The Philosophical Review, 86(4), 474-97
Perry, J. (1997). Rip van Winkle and Other Characters, Dokic, J. (ed.) Cognitive Dynamics, European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2, CSLI Publications, Stanford.
Perry, J. (2001). Reference and Reflexivity, CSLI Publications, Stanford, California.
Richard, M. (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.