Retention and Meaning
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Neki filozofi pokušali su da objasne retenciju verovanja kao i naša mentalna stanja u pogledu dana koje pratimo kroz vreme, i o kojima mislimo, putem jezičkog značenja indeksičkih izraza pomoću kojih referiramo na dane, kao što su ‘danas’ i ‘juče’. U ovom radu razmatram par reprezentativnih pokušaja da se pokaže da je to slučaj i pokazujem da su ti pokušaji bezuspešni. Kako iz ilustrativnih, tako i iz argumentativnih razloga, potom pokazujem da se u ovom pogledu slučaj koji se tiče dana ne razlikuje od slučaja koji se tiče prostorno-vremenskih objekata.
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Božičković, V. Retention and Meaning. Годишњак Филозофског факултета у Новом Саду, 43(1), 41–51. https://doi.org/10.19090/gff.2018.1.41-51
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Референце
Bozickovic, V. (2005). Do Characters Play a Cognitive Role?, Philosophical Psychology, 18(2), 219-229.
Bozickovic, V. (2008). Cognitive Significance and Reflexive Content. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31(5), 545-554.
Bozickovic, V. (2015). Belief Retention: A Fregean Account, Erkenntnis, 80(3), 477-486
Bozickovic, V. (2017). Slicing Thoughts, American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(1), 3-13.
Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Frege, G. (1918). Thoughts, in his Logical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, 1-30.
Kaplan, David (1989). Demonstratives, Almog, J., Perry, J., Wettstein, H., (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 481-563.
Luntley, M. (1997). Dynamic Thoughts and Empty Minds, Dokic, Jerome (ed). Cognitive Dynamics, European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2, CSLI Publications, Stanford.
McDowell, J. (1984). De Re Senses. The Philosophical Quarterly, 34(136), pp. 283-94.
Perry, J. (1977). Frege on Demonstratives, The Philosophical Review, 86(4), 474-97
Perry, J. (1997). Rip van Winkle and Other Characters, Dokic, J. (ed.) Cognitive Dynamics, European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2, CSLI Publications, Stanford.
Perry, J. (2001). Reference and Reflexivity, CSLI Publications, Stanford, California.
Richard, M. (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bozickovic, V. (2008). Cognitive Significance and Reflexive Content. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31(5), 545-554.
Bozickovic, V. (2015). Belief Retention: A Fregean Account, Erkenntnis, 80(3), 477-486
Bozickovic, V. (2017). Slicing Thoughts, American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(1), 3-13.
Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Frege, G. (1918). Thoughts, in his Logical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1977, 1-30.
Kaplan, David (1989). Demonstratives, Almog, J., Perry, J., Wettstein, H., (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 481-563.
Luntley, M. (1997). Dynamic Thoughts and Empty Minds, Dokic, Jerome (ed). Cognitive Dynamics, European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2, CSLI Publications, Stanford.
McDowell, J. (1984). De Re Senses. The Philosophical Quarterly, 34(136), pp. 283-94.
Perry, J. (1977). Frege on Demonstratives, The Philosophical Review, 86(4), 474-97
Perry, J. (1997). Rip van Winkle and Other Characters, Dokic, J. (ed.) Cognitive Dynamics, European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2, CSLI Publications, Stanford.
Perry, J. (2001). Reference and Reflexivity, CSLI Publications, Stanford, California.
Richard, M. (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.